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Abstract: 
A look at potential project structures for use in integrated land use and mass transit 
projects. Four potential structures are put forward – each with different profiles of public 
sector involvement. The dedicated pursuit of Transit Oriented Development involves 
significant policy challenges, implications and opportunities. 
 
Over the past decade and more, many countries and regions have moved toward the 
mainstreaming of PPPs. The British approach to PPPs has been adopted in other contexts 
such as in state-level government in Australia. While the concept emerged as a “new 
approach” to infrastructure implementation, official policies on acceptable PPP 
approaches and structures quickly developed a rigid outlook. Some basic PPP 
assumptions on the nature of partnerships, and on topics such as the allocation of risk, 
may need fundamental re-assessment.  
 
Transit Oriented Development (TOD) tends to involve significant input from the public 
sector and the private. The most effective approach to combining the strengths of each 
sector in major projects has long been debated, though few firm policy options have been 
put forward. Options for project structure are generally unclear and uncertain. The stakes 
are high because these projects involve long-term land use and transport changes, and the 
creation of new and significant living and working environments. Large financial 
commitments are involved. Perhaps by clarifying the options for TOD project structure 
we can deliver more certainty and workability and assist the progress of these projects.   
 
The paper presents four potential models for TOD projects, all of which might be 
regarded as PPPs (depending on the acceptable definition). The focus is on clarity in 
financial arrangements and management structures for effective project delivery.  
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Finance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Around the world, the new momentum for urban planning, transport, development and 
design is in integrated land use and transit solutions. European and Asian cities have a 
head-start in terms of better transit infrastructure. Yet it is in North America and 
Australasia, where population growth pressures are greatest, that fairly radical changes in 
policy direction are occurring. The embracing of smart growth principles, of transit 
oriented development (TCRP 2004) and a generational switch from road expenditure to 
transit infrastructure investment is gradually changing the lifestyle options and planning 
typologies in new world cities (OUM 2005; SEQIPP 2006; DOI 2002; DOI 2006; DOP 
2005). The 21st century urban landscape sees greater demand for apartment and 
townhouse living from both younger housing consumers looking for a vibrant urban 
milieu, and older people who are no longer keen on the isolation and maintenance 
demands of the suburban house and garden (Salt 2003; Dittmar & Ohland 2004). 
 
In transport, a discernible shift is occurring in which the wisdom of large-scale road 
construction is now openly questioned in the mainstream media (Hale 2008). Fuel price 
rises, congestion and environmental factors are putting pressure on public transport 
systems to accommodate a new wave of passengers (Sandy 2008). At the same time, this 
economic and environmental context is creating a shift in which economic and financial 
viability studies for public transport should become more favorable.  
 
Variations of public private partnerships (PPPs) have been proposed and implemented in 
many areas that were traditionally the concern of the public sector exclusively (DIP 2002; 
DTF 2000). The most clearly beneficial aspect of a PPP seems to be that they are 
generally delivered on time and on budget. Additionally, they are said to facilitate the 
implementation of projects beyond the capabilities of a pure public sector approach. In 
summary; time, cost and capability advantages form the main case in favour of PPPs. On 
the negative side, many researchers have questioned the veracity of some claims 
regularly made about PPPs (Hodge 2004; Hodge & Greve 2007; Shaoul 2002; Wakeford 
& Valentine 2001; Duffield & Regan 2004). Claimed advantages such as “innovation” 
and “public sector risk reduction” are now facing open season in academe and perhaps 
the critical media. PPPs are receiving a lot of scrutiny regarding foggy governance, 
accountability, and financial arrangements. 
 
After over a decade of PPP successes and failures, it is time to reassess the model and 
some of the underlying assumptions. The basic concept of “partnership” lies at the heart 
of the strengths and weaknesses, and future potential of PPPs. In the realm of Transit 
Oriented Development, unique project circumstances are creating a demand for project 
structures (perhaps of a PPP nature) that can effectively balance public and private 
concerns for the creation of sustainable, transit-served communities and activity centres. 
As yet though, there are few examples of an off-the-shelf PPP model for TOD. 
Population growth pressures and changing planning contexts probably imply that the 
demand for workable, transparent and understandable TOD project structures is set to 
grow significantly.  
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For these reasons, the paper seeks to establish some basic parameters on which viable 
PPP ventures in TOD may be based. Four potential TOD models are put forward. These 
models will be refined and clarified during a subsequent research process based on 
stakeholder feedback – a process to which parties around the world engaged in transit 
oriented development activities are invited to contribute. 
 
 
2. PPPs – A Brief Review of Strengths and Weaknesses  
 
“The common ground among PPP definitions in Australasia is that government has a 
business relationship, it is long term, with risks and returns being shared, and that 
private business becomes involved in financing, designing, constructing, owning or 
operating public facilities or services.” (Hodge 2004, p37) 
 
Looking at the literature on perceived or identified weaknesses in recent PPP approaches, 
a number of important issues emerge repeatedly. The first is that PPPs often fall prey to 
“salesmanship”, “rhetoric” and that they may in some instances “camouflage” 
arrangements that provide the public with a poor deal. (Hodge 2004; Hodge & Greve 
2007; Shaoul 2002). Financial arrangements may at times constrain or limit the public 
interest. PPPs sometimes seem to preference projects that appear effective on restricted 
finance-based criteria over those that may have a broader economic impact to offer the 
public. In practice, valuation of assets in question may be extremely difficult over long 
time frames against uncertain usage outcomes and economic or policy contexts. Specific 
questions have also arisen over the veracity of “public sector comparators” in which 
public sector advantages in the cost of finance are ignored or deliberately left out of the 
equation (Shaoul 2002, p55). Questions have been raised about the a priori assumption 
that the private sector is inherently more efficient (Shaoul 2002, p57). Some sources have 
also pointed out that there is often confusion, deliberate or otherwise, between 
efficiencies and economies – which are often the result of reductions in project scope 
under a PPP model (Shaoul 2002, p57) 
 
The methodology and assumptions of “risk transfer” are open to doubt (Shaoul 2002, 
p56). This specific question will form a component of the case mounted in this paper for 
new options in PPPs for TOD. Many sources have pointed out that on-the-ground cases 
of troubled PPP projects have ended up with the public sector as ultimate project 
guarantor and prime holder of project risk. (Shaoul 2002, p59; Duffield & Regan 2004) 
 
Further analysis opens up the possibility that there are other politic and business agendas 
at play beyond the stated regard for public value-for-money (Hodge & Greve 2004, p545). 
Some analyses of PPPs see them as a product of political currents at large during the 
early and mid 1990s. The pressure to reduce public sector budget deficits was seen as one 
contributing factor (which may no longer be as relevant). And finally, it appears that 
broader areas of activity such as strategic transport planning are being subsumed by the 
pressure to package urban life into a neat PPP. It has been suggested that in the 
Australian context, rail projects are having difficulty finding traction because projects 
with long asset lives are struggling to compete for attention with toll-based road PPPs 
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(Forsyth 2008). There is also a question emerging as to whether some of the assumptions 
and parameters of transport planning are being “cooked” to boost politically-favoured 
road infrastructure PPPs (Forsyth 2008).  
 
In contrast to the many and varied critiques of PPP approaches, a handful of compelling 
issues and outcomes emerge as bona fide support for this approach to major infrastructure. 
In summary the three main issues are advantages in cost, completion time and 
capability – when compared to public sector outcomes (Hodge 2004, p38; Hodge & 
Greve 2007, p550). 
 
One of the most problematic aspects of PPP approaches would appear to be the 
reluctance to offer a flexible, easy-to-understand, partnership-based approach that may be 
at odds to the standard doctrine on PPPs. 
 
 
3. Transit Oriented Development – Unique, Complex Project 
Demands  
 
While many PPP projects relate purely to infrastructure provision such as rail and roads, 
TOD presents a unique project typology that provides challenges beyond those faced by 
other transport PPPs. A working definition of TOD might be: 
“A vibrant, relatively dense and pedestrianised mixed-use development precinct, 
featuring quality public space and immediate access to high-frequency public transit.” 
(Hale and Charles 2006, p1) 
 
Within this definition we can see that there are four or more major elements of TOD that 
need to be in place if the “end product” is to be judged a success. In project terms this 
means that a successful TOD may require a significant upgrade to transit service or 
infrastructure from, say, a state government transit agency. It may also require better 
public space provision – a realm that is often the preserve of local government. In terms 
of real estate development, we would expect that large-scale mixed-use construction and 
marketing will rely on the skills of major private sector developers. With this mix of 
requirements and inputs, any major TOD undertaking will involve constructive 
partnering between various private and public stakeholders (TCRP 2004, ch 2,3; Dittmar 
& Ohland 2004, ch3,5). It is important to identify workable project models that 
effectively combine and facilitate the different interests (Curtis & James 2004). The 
standardized PPP approaches referred to in the previous section will probably be 
incapable of effectively delivering TOD without major clarification, refinement, or 
wholesale change. This is not to say that some elements of the standardized PPP 
approach may not be applicable. A new approach is required to PPPs for TOD – one that 
is built on the needs and role of various key stakeholders. We will categorise these 
stakeholders below, via the major areas of endeavor and required outcomes. 
Transport 
It is in the interests of all stakeholders to see better outcomes in transit service and 
infrastructure for TOD. In the Australian context and in others, it is usually the task of 
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transit agencies, often an arm of State-level governments, to deliver the required transport 
outcomes. TOD requires high-frequency, high-capacity mass transit service (Hale & 
Charles 2006; TCRP 2004, ch8). A TOD location needs to be readily accessible to the 
primary business locations and activity centers within its broader region. It also needs to 
integrated effectively into its transport corridor and its population catchment (Vuchic 
2005, p268, 269, 283). This requires a well-designed transit station which is effectively 
served by feeder services, allowing effective transfers to other lines and services. Rail 
corridors may well require upgrades to serve the increased patronage that the new TOD 
development will deliver. Projects will also often involve the development of transit 
agency real estate assets including stations and adjacent land. In this context, the transit 
stakeholder has an imperative to be involved in a meaningful project partnership with 
other stakeholders. An effective partnership will need to accommodate the complex 
financial and organizational issues involved (TCRP 2004, ch3, Dittmar & Ohland, ch3,5; 
Curtis & James 2004). The transit stakeholders have much to offer a TOD PPP – yet they 
also have a great deal to gain if development and improved public realm boost patronage. 
 
Real Estate Development 
The real estate development component of TOD is a cornerstone of an effective project. 
It is also the project component that deviates most obviously outside the normal sphere of 
public sector activities. The development of dense, mixed-use real estate in connection 
with a TOD precinct is an area in which the public sector might expect delivery to fall to 
the responsibility of private developers (TCRP 2004, ch5).  
 
An additional complexity in the case of real estate development for TOD is the desire for 
the public sector to access some of the real estate value uplift of transit investment. This 
strategy, commonly referred to as “value capture”, is one of the guiding principles of 
TOD (D&O 2004, p26; TCRP 2004, p173-176). In this sense, there is an impetus to have 
closer partnership arrangements between public sector TOD proponents and private 
developers with an interest in TOD. Value capture is also a relevant guiding principle in 
cases where the public sector holds substantial land assets around a transit station where 
TOD development is proposed. A further layer of complexity is created for real estate 
development in TOD due to the long time frames and strategic nature of projects.  
 
In summary, there are a number of reasons why a model of TOD in which real estate 
development is purely the preserve of private developers may not be the optimal 
arrangement. While public sector TOD proponents will often need to rely on private 
delivery skills for development outcomes, there are compelling reasons why partnerships 
between private and public stakeholders are desirable. 
 
Public Realm and Master planning 
Quality TODs are said to require effective master planning and the creation of high-
quality public realm (Hale & Charles 2006). This might include measures aimed at 
pedestrianising and revitalizing core shopping streets. It may include better planting and 
hard-scaping of public space. It may require changes to planning codes and zoning 
instruments that can assist with the facilitation of urban renewal or substantial 
development around a key transit node (TCRP 2004, ch4). All of these aspects are largely 
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beyond the control of private developers. In order to get the best out of a TOD precinct, 
the project team needs to generate improved outcomes in terms of public realm and the 
interface between the project and its local or state government stakeholders. Public sector 
stakeholders delivering public realm or planning improvements may also be interested to 
recoup up-front costs. There are a variety of public-realm and planning-based reasons 
why effective partnerships between the public and private sectors are important in TOD. 
Relationship of TOD development to existing PPP Doctrines 
The existing body of PPP strategy in use in Australia and elsewhere relies on a handful of 
somewhat rigidly defined processes and formulae. From the Queensland Government’s 
PPP literature we are offered the following series of prescribed steps toward project 
acceptance: 
 
1. Service Identification (the need for the project becomes clear). 2. Preliminary 
Assessment. 3. PPP Business Case Development (including comparison of public sector 
versus PPP option). 4. Expressions of Interest. 5. Binding Bids. 6. Management of 
Contracts. (DIP Aug 2002, p6) 
 
Although these steps provide some assistance for PPP proponents, their applicability in 
the TOD context is open to question. A short list of key concerns might include: 
 
• Issues of land ownership and timing of acquisition 
• Viability of “unsolicited proposals” – a topic which is covered in the DIP 
document but perhaps lacks realism in scenarios where a single land holder is the 
driving force behind a TOD proposal 
• Protection of intellectual property – another crucial issue mentioned in the 
document but not satisfactorily resolved from a practical point of view 
• Ability of the process to meet time constraints and other requirements that 
property development projects face 
• Lack of established precedent for transit oriented development PPPs 
• Ability of the official PPP process to manage a large number of projects that 
might emerge at a multitude of transport nodes and station areas 
• Flexibility to evolve a project structure and approach tailored to the context and 
needs of individual projects 
• Ability to minimise costs to the project of engaging contractors and consultants by 
avoiding full-blown tendering processes where appropriate. 
 
The real estate development and ownership activity within a TOD project implies that 
any PPP process needs to be amenable to mainstream property industry approaches. Of 
significant concern would be the extent to which any PPP recognized norms of ownership, 
partnering, risk management and finance that apply in the real estate industry. A potential  
PPP for transit oriented development will be undermined and thrown into confusion to 
the extent that it deviates from universal industry norms in these areas. 
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4. Finance and Management – the Cornerstones of Effective 
Partnerships 
 
Official PPP documents refer to a novel formula for risk “allocation” (DIP 2002, 10,11) 
 and “partnership” that are relatively untried in the arena of real estate development. On 
the other hand, the mainstream development industry functions according to simple and 
long accepted principles of project structure. 
 
Financial Parameters 
The project activities of the real estate development industry are financed through two 
basic mechanisms: equity finance and bank lending. We may need to remind ourselves 
of these simple frames-of-reference in a context where projects undertaken with both 
public and private input are under pressure to accept new and uncertain mechanisms for 
project structure. Equity finance is essentially an arrangement in which land or real 
estate assets are owned by an entity (a company structure) (Wikipedia 2008). The 
investors in this entity receive a shareholding in the company in proportion to the cash 
they have ventured. In the first instance, the equity investors are looking to ensure that 
they are buying into a venture that is founded on an accurate valuation of assets and 
prospects. In practice, equity investors in real estate projects are largely buying into the 
tangible, relatively liquid assets of the venture such as land. Bank finance or “debt”) 
(Wikipedia 2008) is usually applied in real estate development projects for the purpose of 
funding construction of the project. It is generally not used to cover land acquisition. 
 
Partnerships and Management 
The “partnerships” of a real estate venture are very specifically tied to equity ventured 
into the project (Milne in Squirell ed 1997, p263; Wikipedia 2008). The relative strength 
and influence of the project partners is closely tied to the relative amount of equity 
ventured. In simple terms, a 51% equity holding in a development project provides the 
investor with a small majority interest in the project. A very small project equity stake 
(say 5% for argument’s sake) will provide an investor with limited influence over the 
project. The project partners are the equity stakeholders. Any party that does not have a 
direct equity stake is not within the partnership. This equity-based business partnership 
arrangement is applicable across almost all business ventures. This, in itself, should be a 
reason to question and re-assess the validity of the non-mainstream approach to 
partnering that official PPPs propose. 
 
Risk and Reward 
In an equity-based business partnering arrangement (Wikipedia 2008; Milne in Squirell 
ed 1997, p263), the risks (in both upside and downside) are allocated in accordance with 
the proportion of equity the partner holds in the project. In simple terms, a project partner 
with a majority 51% equity stake will share in 51% of project profit – or will be 
responsible for 51% of any loss that the venture incurs. Risks and rewards are not arrived 
at by legal haggling or apportioned by complex formulae. This approach is tested and 
proven across many centuries of business activity and in all areas of financial life. By 
contrast, the official PPP guidelines, and project agreements themselves, often apportion 
project risk in a manner contrary to the foundation principle of the equity stake. For this 
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reason alone the newer business approaches entailed by official PPPs should be re-
appraised and critically examined. 
 
A New Typology of Project Partnership Analysis 
“Overall then, PPPs seem to have at least two dimensions. The first dimension is finance: 
How are public and private actors engaged financially in PPPs? The other dimension is 
organizational: How tightly organized are public actors and private actors”.  
(Hodge & Greve 2007, p547) 
In a project or enterprise context in which both public sector and private sector partners 
are involved, we might propose an arrangement that appropriately balances the two key 
dimensions of project finance/ownership and steering/management. 
Picture 1. Matrix of TOD Structural Relationships. 
 
Steering 
        
Private             D  
          
 B 
   
               
      
 A 
       
Public     C          
         
             
Ownership 
   Public    Private  
 
 
The matrix outlines a theoretical spectrum of project steering and ownership. The shaded 
cubes recommend project structures in which ownership of the project through equity 
investment is effectively balanced with project control and management. Project 
structures outside the shaded areas would represent projects where ownership and 
steering is not appropriately balanced. The letters “A, B, C” and “D” denote the position 
in the project spectrum of the TOD partnership models outlined in Part 5 of the paper. 
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5. Potential Models for Transit Oriented Development PPP 
 
Project Model A - “Government Sponsored” 
 
This government-sponsored project model would see government agencies (whether 
state/regional, local or both) playing a leading role in most aspects of the project. 
Government would be supported and complimented by private industry partners. 
 
Financial Structure and Investment 
 
An independent specialist financial services provider (a financial services “license 
holder”) would play a key role in setting up and managing the Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) – which is a project-specific company structure for the pooling of equity funds, the 
holding of land and for access to construction finance. The specialist financial services 
provider would essentially be playing an independent “financial manager” role. The use 
of a financial manager for operation of the SPV has a number of advantages – but 
primarily it offers the opportunity to balance key project stakeholder interests according 
to equity ventured. Investors can apportion their desired risk and return levels according 
to the equity they invest. In the case of Model A, the financial structure features majority 
investment from government or its agencies. The financial manager is in a position to 
oversee the operation of project finances in a manner that balances the sometimes 
competing needs of different project investors. 
 
Under project model A, government or a government agency takes a controlling equity 
stake (51% or more) in the SPV. Once the equity stake had been ventured, government 
would have the same rights and responsibilities as other investors – albeit that its 
significant equity stake provides for greater representation, influence and responsibility in 
board-level decision making. The remaining (non-government) investors could comprise 
any or all of: a developer; a funds manager with an interest in property development 
projects; a bank or financial institution seeking equity investments; one or more 
“sophisticated” investors (high net worth individuals, or people who undertake property 
investment as a vocation), or perhaps even the “retail” market for small investors. 
Investors would probably need to be provided with a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) 
outlining project fundamentals, risks and expected or target investment performance. The 
project “financial manager” (the financial services specialist) would be the point of 
contact for investors in the SPV – and would be paid on a fee basis for financial 
management activities.  
 
Board of Directors 
 
Assuming the board of directors for the SPV is “lean and mean”, it might be built around: 
 
• the Development Director. Effectively the project CEO – the “DD” has 
exceptional financial, strategic and property development skills. 
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• the Project Manager - assisting the DD, and focusing on day to day project 
issues. 
• The Finance Director. Focusing on the management of the SPV, ideally this 
director would be a representative of the financial management firm that is 
operating the SPV. The Finance Director also has responsibility for tracking the 
financial position of the project. 
• Government Representative A – representing the government’s financial 
interests in the project.  
• Government Representative B – another board position would recognise the 
significant of the government’s interests in the project, but government might 
wish to exercise that interest through influence on planning and design. 
• An Investor Representative would recognise the equity stake of one of the major 
investors or JV partners.  
 
The 6-person board structure outlined above could be altered or adjusted according to 
circumstance, but represents a fairly clear indication of what an effective board of 
directors might look like for a medium or large-scale redevelopment project.  Due to the 
“outcomes” focus of a significant project, and the financial, planning, transport and 
development knowledge required for effective project delivery, it is imperative that the 
board be established on merit, qualifications, skills and potential. Board directors would 
have ultimate financial responsibility for project outcomes, including financial results.  
 
Project Team (client side) 
 
The project needs effective client-side representation in a variety of key fields and 
professions, with team members reporting to and working with the Development Director 
and the Project Manager. These client-side advisors would manage relationships and 
contracts with key project consultants and contractors. They would play a major role in 
guiding the project through to completion. The project team would also play a key role in 
the project development phase – assisting with the conceptualisation and establishment of 
a workable and attractive project. Client-side project staff need to be leaders in their 
fields, with high levels of skill, strong qualifications, vision and stamina. They would 
also need the ability to grow, to adapt and to develop their skills in what is a relatively 
“new” and novel field. Although 8 or 9 roles are listed here, an ideal project team size 
might be 5-6 personnel (or fewer) on a mix of full-time and part-time engagement. In 
some cases, members of the board of directors may take on certain of the project team’s 
client side roles. Some of the client-side team members might themselves be engaged on 
a consulting basis. Some project staff could take on two or more of the client side 
responsibilities listed below: 
 
• A TOD Specialist providing advice on best-practice in TOD. They would 
perhaps be drawing on familiarity with successful international TOD projects. 
They would need to provide strategic advice that understands and spans the 
spectrum of disciplines involved in TOD – and would need research skills to drive 
problem-solving. 
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• The Property Finance Analyst would keep and periodically update the project 
spread sheets. They would incorporate advice on revenues, costs and timing from 
other project participants. They would need to keep the project team appraised of 
current and future financial performance issues and movements in property 
market trends. The DD and PM might rely heavily on their strategic advice. 
• The Design Manager would be an architect or urban designer overseeing the 
creation of precinct configuration and built form. 
• The Planning Advisor would manage and keep track of the relationship with 
local government and state planning authorities. They would manage the planning 
consultants and also have a strong input on design and configuration issues. 
• A Construction Manager can assist with the relationships between the project 
and its construction contractors. This role is important during project development 
stage – where a builder would need to be identified, short-listed and hired. 
Primarily though, the skills of a client-side construction specialist are invaluable 
during the delivery phase of a major project. 
• A Transport Advisor might ensure proper integration between the project and 
the all-important transit facility, as well as negotiating the timely delivery of 
transit services to underpin the viability of the precinct. This advisor could 
manage the relationship between the project and the relevant transit agencies. 
• A Marketing Manager would oversee the project’s real estate agents and 
marketing teams to ensure the timely sale and leasing of project property assets.  
 
Strengths of Model A 
 
Model A delivers a number of significant benefits – especially when taking a “public 
interest” viewpoint. Strengths include: 
 
Delivery of Value Capture 
Model A, which is based on a large government equity stake in the project, allows for 
achievement of “value capture” in a profitable project. Value capture can be defined as a 
return on the public investment in transit infrastructure and related capital stock such as 
facilities – or on project development, master planning and design activity. The return is 
provided through the “capture” of property value uplifts, or development potential that 
these interventions create.  
 
General Public Sector Influence on Project Outcomes 
While the public sector may not always see itself as having a frontline role in urban 
development activities, there seems to be a greater requirement for public sector 
influence on TOD outcomes. Public interest arguments for government involvement 
include:  
 
• The need to achieve positive social and environmental outcomes in TOD. 
• The long-term role and the significance of TODs in urban structure and form.  
• The need for a master-planning approach to TOD precincts.  
• The size and complexity of TOD projects necessitates heavy public sector 
involvement. Model A matches heavy public sector involvement with influence 
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on project direction – allowing incorporation of public interest goals and 
government stakeholder objectives. 
 
In summary, Model A allows for significant public sector influence in the TOD project – 
matching directorial-level control to the equity stake that government would hold. 
 
TOD as a Transport Project 
TOD is considered to be an important tool for boosting public transport patronage and 
operating efficiency. These goals have been nominated as a primary motivating factor for 
TOD activity in the USA (TCRP 2004, p10). When we remove the transport rationale for 
TOD projects, their necessity becomes less obvious – even considering the positive urban 
design outcomes that such projects offer. Successful TOD requires the provision of 
quality transport services and the integration of transport facilities with their direct 
precincts. This requires heavy public sector involvement. Model A allows a level of 
project influence that perhaps corresponds to the responsibilities that transport agencies 
and other public sector players will inevitably have in TOD.  
 
In addition, the significance and scale of corresponding public transport infrastructure 
investments should be a motivator for public sector involvement in TOD. When set 
against the overall costs and risks involved in major transit projects, we might conclude 
that TOD activity offers an affordable, “self-funding” mechanism for underpinning the 
success of new transit infrastructure and services. 
 
Risk Management 
Model A proposes a significant level of public sector equity investment and exposure to 
project risk/reward outcomes. While this might at first seem to be an increase in overall 
public sector risk exposure levels, it is important to remember that the model provides a 
controlled-risk environment, and that it offers simple mechanisms (such as a sell-down of 
project shareholding) for risk reduction.  
 
 
 
Picture: Southern Cross Station – Melbourne.  
Built as a PPP, the once-controversial project is now an iconic fixture in Melbourne. C Hale April 2006. 
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Project Model B - “Developer Led” 
 
The developer-led project model would see a major development company play the 
leading role in most aspects of the project, but with government retaining a minority 
equity stake in the project. 
 
Financial Structure and Investment 
 
As with Model A, it is recommended that a specialist financial services provider sets up 
and manages the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), playing an independent “financial 
manager” role. This independence in financial structure is important for balancing the 
needs and interests of different project investors. An independent SPV allows a diverse 
equity base for the project. Model B offers perhaps the only viable project structure that 
can offer a leading role to a development firm, while still providing government with the 
opportunity to be a project investor. Alternative models, in which the SPV is not 
independently managed, do not appear to allow public sector interests and priorities to be 
effectively balanced, and probably do not provide an attractive investment structure for 
potential public sector investors.  
 
Under project Model B, an expression of interest (EOI)-winning developer holds a 
controlling equity stake (51% or more) in the SPV. Investors receive board level-
representation roughly in line with the value of their share holding.  A Product Disclosure 
Statement (PDS) may still be required as part of the EOI process – and to attract 
investment from other parties beyond the government and EOI-winner. The project 
“financial manager” (the financial services specialist) is the point of contact for all 
investors in the SPV. The government investor and the other investors might alter their 
project exposure at a later stage by selling down share holdings (or increasing them). 
 
Board of Directors 
 
A board of directors under Model B might include: 
 
• the Development Director provided either from the staff roster of the investing 
developer or engaged as a consultant/contractor. 
• the Project Manager also from the developer or involved on a consulting basis. 
• The Finance Director. From the independent financial services provider who 
maintains the SPV – or perhaps from the developer. 
• Government Representative This representative has the perhaps un-enviable 
task of maintaining a “public interest” standpoint in a project where the public 
sector only holds a minority stake. 
 
Project Team (client side) 
 
Under Model B, it is highly likely that the majority of the project team are drawn from 
within the staff roster of the developer. Broadly speaking, the same client side roles are 
required as in Model A. Presumably a strong private sector transport planner would need 
 15 
to be identified – who would have to manage effective integration of the project with 
related transit infrastructure and service levels.  
 
Strengths of Model B 
 
Risk Reduction 
In Model B, the government is able to effectively reduce its holding of TOD land and 
project exposure levels, while still maintaining a certain level of influence and 
involvement in the project. This represents a basic risk reduction outcome. Under Model 
B, government would maintain some level of interest in the project, but a minority 
interest holder needs to respect the majority interest’s ability to steer the project in 
directions that align more with their own requirements. In this sense, the lower level of 
project control for the public sector under Model B could be seen as balancing out risk 
reduction outcomes. 
 
Value Capture 
The maintenance of a certain level of project equity for government under the Model B 
approach allows access to value created by any transport infrastructure investment and 
service improvements. The extent of value capture is essentially in-line with the level of 
equity held. Judicious attention to design and planning issues during the master-planning 
exercise prior to EOI also has the potential to lift the development value of a government 
land holding – effectively increasing the valuation figure at which the land is ventured 
into the SPV.  
 
Public Sector Influence on Project Outcomes 
A TOD project undertaken through Model B also offers a series of public interest 
“opportunities” including: ability to positively influence social and environmental 
outcomes in TOD; the chance to cement a long-term positive element in the urban 
structure; and the ability to deliver a master-planned TOD precinct. Public interest 
outcomes through Model B might be mediated through the government’s financial and 
management role in the project, through its role in the master-planning process – as well 
as through its standard areas of influence in planning policy and infrastructure delivery. 
 
Developer Skills and Resources 
Under Model B, the management and funding of the project is primarily delivered by an 
experienced and well-credentialed development firm. Although it should be noted that 
TOD is a relatively “new” typology of development, and most developers would need to 
learn and adapt new skills in a challenging setting.  
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Project Model C - “Public Sector Project” 
 
The “public-sector” project model would see a public sector agency planning and steering 
the project – most likely with the extensive use of consultants and alliance contracting 
partners. Government would bear the vast majority of financial responsibilities and risks, 
but would be in a position to reap extensively from the financial rewards. 
 
Financial Structure and Investors 
 
As with the other models, it is envisaged that a pure public sector project would require 
the establishment of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for project finance and operations -  
in order to deliver flexibility and a degree of project independence. The public sector 
sponsoring agency would be in a position to establish the SPV through the creation of a 
standard company structure – but there would be no pressing need to involve a financial 
services manager. Project financing would presumably occur through standard public 
sector finance processes. Government provides all project equity and is responsible (via 
its corporatised SPV entity) for liabilities. Any and all profits are retained by government.  
 
Project Partners 
 
Government may seek an alliance-style partner for project delivery. This partner could 
provide a comprehensive suite of development services – including real estate marketing, 
design, planning and construction. Alternatively, government might seek a series of 
alliance partners who specialise in the various fields – with specialist project planners and 
designers playing a role, and with a construction firm delivering the project built form.  
 
Board of Directors 
 
A board of directors under Model C might include: 
• the Development Director from the staff roster of a government agency, or 
perhaps engaged as a consultant/contractor, or drawn from the staff of the alliance 
development/construction partner. 
• the Project Manager - similarly sourced. 
• the Finance Director would probably come from within government – and may 
draw on consultants for advice in property development issues. 
• Government Representative A – representing transport interests.  
• Government Representative B – planning and design considerations.  
 
Project Team (client side) 
 
The project needs effective client-side representation in a variety of key fields and 
professions, with team members reporting to and working with the Development Director 
and the Project Manager. These client-side advisors would manage relationships and 
contracts with key project consultants and contractors or perhaps with the alliance partner. 
Some project team members would take on two or more of the following client side 
responsibilities: A TOD Specialist providing advice on best-practice in TOD; the 
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Property Finance Analyst would keep the project team appraised of current and future 
financial; the Design Manager; the Planning Advisor; a Construction Manager; a 
Transport Advisor; a Marketing Manager.  
 
Strengths of Model C 
 
Risk Reduction 
In Model C, government actively manages project costs, timing and other risks through 
the relationship with the alliance partner. Public and private sector knowledge and 
resources are combined to deliver the best possible performance on measures of timing 
and cost. Areas of risk and opportunity such as marketing and construction receive strong 
risk attention through appropriate staffing. There are major long-term risks associated 
with poorly performing TODs in terms of transport, social, public realm and other 
outcomes. We might suggest that Model C balances these major public sector risks quite 
effectively by maximising public sector control and influence. It is not clear that the 
public sector can deliver TOD outcomes without addressing some level of market-based 
risk and real estate activity.  
 
Value Capture 
Model C offers the most complete opportunity for value capture of all the models. Any 
and all project profit is returned to government – creating a direct linking mechanism 
between state transport infrastructure investment and service improvements, and any 
value uplift created in the direct precinct of major transit stations. 
 
Public Sector Influence on Project Outcomes 
Model C offers the opportunity for very high levels of public sector control over all 
aspects of the project, from planning, design and project initiation, through to eventual 
completion. Government can play close attention to achieving its priority objectives in 
transport planning, land-use planning, in the creation of livable precincts – and can 
hopefully achieve strongly on many measures related to social, economic and 
environmental outcomes.  
 
Familiarity 
Model C delivers TOD within traditional, well-understood public sector processes – even 
if property development may not be a familiar field for the public sector.  
 
Workload 
It would probably be a rash assumption to suggest that Model C automatically ties the 
public sector into increased workloads and onerous resourcing requirements. It seems 
apparent that all project models under review, and probably TOD activity more generally, 
requires significant attention and resources from the public sector. Even under the 
“developer-led” approach in Model B, we are assuming that government ploughs 
significant time and money into project conceptualisation, the design and planning stages 
and the identification and engagement of a preferred development partner as well as 
ongoing input through the life of the project. In summary, it might be argued that the 
workload for government in Model C may be similar to that in other models. 
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Project Model D - “Private Sector Project” 
 
The “private-sector” project model would see a developer initiating and steering the 
project. The developer would bear all development-related financial responsibilities and 
risks, but would clearly need to develop strong relationships with relevant public sector 
stakeholders – especially in transport. 
 
Financial Structure 
 
A developer-dependent project would probably require the establishment of a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for project finance and operations, and the publication of a 
Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) for potential investors. In this model is that the 
public sector has no interest in the financial and development aspects of the project. If the 
developer is unable to raise capital, the project will not go ahead. There is no (or very 
little) scope for public sector financial support – even if the social, planning and transport 
outcomes that the project offers are of significant interest to public sector stakeholders.  
 
Partnering with the Public Sector 
 
The developer will need to cultivate strong relationships with the public sector in order to 
deliver the project. Primarily, transport agencies will need to deliver service levels and 
station infrastructure that supports the precinct as a true TOD destination. Where new 
infrastructure is under development, there is a necessity to achieve timely coordination 
between delivery of the transit improvement and the project completion and marketing 
phases of the development project. This represents an extremely challenging working 
environment for a developer. In addition, the planning aspects of the project will need 
strong support from local and/or state government. If supportive local planning has been 
provided, the developer can advance through the standard development application 
process. In the absence of clear and supportive planning frameworks, the developer will 
need to make a strong argument on performance-based planning criteria – or engage 
government support for changes to the planning scheme. Both of these paths are resource 
intensive, uncertain and time consuming – and require in-depth engagement with 
government representatives beyond the comfort zone of regular development processes. 
 
Project Team  
 
Beyond the requirements of a regular real estate development project, the TOD developer 
may need to consider engaging: a TOD Specialist providing advice on best-practice in 
TOD; and a Transport Advisor. 
 
Strengths of Model D 
 
Risk Reduction 
In Model D, government is absolved of financial and other risks and commitments 
associated with the development itself. It is not clear that the public sector is completely 
free of risk however. The key risk factor issue in this model is the potential for sub-
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optimal outcomes in significant transit-adjacent precincts. Outcomes in the fields of 
transport and broader social and environmental concerns cannot be guaranteed and can 
only be minimally influenced by the public sector under this model.  
 
Private Sector Development Skills and Flexibility 
In Model D, development activity is in the hands of the natural possessors of relevant 
skills. It is often remarked that the private sector are able to deliver projects in a rapid and 
flexible manner, especially in property development.  
 
Public Sector Workload 
The degree to which Model D reduces public sector workloads is dependent on the 
degree to which government and its agencies take a “hands-off” approach to outcomes. 
Model D offers the opportunity for the public sector to take a less interventionist 
approach, and perhaps reduce their perceived responsibility. If the project is undertaken 
at a precinct with significant transport and community interests, the ability for the public 
sector to reduce general workloads may not be particularly significant in reality. 
 
 
 
Picture: Ang Mo Kio interchange – Singapore.  
Many hubs in Singapore are developed as integrated retail and transport projects.  
C Hale April 2008. 
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E. Proposed Stakeholder Input for the Refinement of the 4 
Models 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to present a handful of potential PPP-style models 
and structures for application in transit oriented development projects of varying scale. 
From this point, the research effort will be extended through refinement of the models 
and some targeted elaboration in areas that are novel or unclear. In order to achieve a 
body of intellectual property in transit oriented development project structures, interested 
parties are invited to be involved in a stakeholder feedback process. The feedback process 
will allow stakeholders in government, consulting, development, finance and other areas 
the opportunity to provide suggestions and areas for clarity and improvement. 
Stakeholders will have their time and input repaid through priority access to the 
intellectual property that is developed. 
 
The basic phases of subsequent intellectual property development will include: 
 
a) Presentation of the initial “4 models” paper at the 3rd International Conference on 
Funding Transport Infrastructure at Paris in June 2008. 
b) Issue of a questionnaire to interested stakeholders which invites both structured 
feedback in specific areas of the 4 models, as well as open comment and 
suggestions for areas of priority to stakeholders. 
c) Second-phase paper presentation through a peer reviewed transport forum or 
publication and a real estate development or urban planning forum – presenting a 
refined series of options and models. 
d) Development and further refinement of the new body of intellectual property 
through application in project settings. Commercialisation possibilities will be 
explored and teaching and advisory opportunities pursued. 
 
Interested industry stakeholders are encouraged to contact the research effort via the 
author, at: c.hale2@uq.edu.au 
 
 
 
Picture: Q Centre, Roma St Station – Brisbane (artist’s impression). A project being built on public sector 
real estate – but does it achieve “value capture”?. Courtesy Ray White Commercial. 
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F. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The current frameworks for PPPs are coming under question and may not be optimal for 
transit oriented development projects. But as significant projects in which land use, 
development, urban planning, transit infrastructure and the public realm are all inter-
dependent, it is clear that effective mechanisms are required to facilitate outcomes. We 
need to assume that some form of partnering between private and public stakeholders will 
be a key component of many TOD activities. 
 
The paper has outlined four potential models for TOD projects, based on the balance of 
interests in project finance (equity or “ownership”) and management (“steering”). Under 
Potential Model A, the public sector underwrites and controls the project through a 
majority interest, but is allowing minority equity partnership from private developers 
and/or investors. In Model B, the balance is inverted and the public sector takes only a 
minority stake, while private developers steer the project according to their majority 
interest. In Model C, the standard public sector procurement approach is adopted, and any 
private industry involvement is limited to a contracting role. Finally, in Model D we see 
the approach in which private developers take on the overwhelming bulk of TOD 
responsibility – with the public sector only intervening on an informal basis. A key 
consideration in this spectrum of project models is the extent to which they allow “value 
capture” or the recouping of public sector project costs. 
 
The author recommends that regions pursuing a TOD or “Smart Growth” policy actively 
engage in research and discussion to promote semi-standardised project operational 
models. This might facilitate the mobilisation of a large number of TOD projects, rather 
than a handful of micro-managed test-cases. While the planning, design and transport 
aspects of TOD are now better understood, institutional and project management issues 
remain a major concern and an area in which new ideas and discussion need to occur. 
 
 
 
Picture: “The Mill” project, Albion Station – Brisbane (artist’s impression).  A TOD initiative from 
developers FKP, drawing on planning support from Brisbane City Council and a station improvement 
agreement with Queensland Rail. Courtesy FKP. 
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